IsraelMilitary.net

Demolishing Hamas

By Martin Kramer
The Jerusalem Post, January 4, 2009

Edited by Andy Ross

Israel's long-term strategic goal is the elimination of Hamas control of Gaza. The Kadima and Labor parties are committed to a negotiated final-status agreement with the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas. Hamas rule in Gaza is a bone in the throat of the "peace process."

After the Hamas takeover in June 2007, Israel imposed a regime of economic sanctions on Gaza, constricting the flow of goods and materials into Gaza via its border crossings. The idea was gradually to undermine the popularity of Hamas in Gaza, while at the same time bolstering Abbas.

The West Bank enjoyed an economic boomlet as Israel removed checkpoints and facilitated the movement of capital, goods, workers, and foreign tourists. Meanwhile, Gaza languished under sanctions, with zero growth, reinforcing the message that "Islamic resistance" is a dead end.

Hamas sought to break out of what it has called the Israeli "siege" by firing rockets into Israel. Its quid pro quo was an end to rocket fire in exchange for a lifting of the "siege." Israel and Hamas reached an agreement for "calm" last June, but Hamas refused to renew the agreement after six months and renewed rocket fire.

Were Israel to lift the economic sanctions, it would transform Hamas control of Gaza into a permanent fact, solidify the division of the West Bank and Gaza, and undermine both Israel and Abbas by showing that violent "resistance" to Israel produces better results than peaceful compromise and cooperation.

Many Western and Arab governments would like to see Abbas and the Palestinian Authority back in authority over Gaza, thus restoring credibility to the "peace process." Because they wish to see Hamas contained if not diminished, they have moved slowly or not at all to respond to calls to stop the fighting.

Israel's objective is to put another player on the ground in Gaza, which over time would be positioned to undermine Hamas. And since the objective is gradually restoring Gaza to control by Abbas and the PA, it seems logical to assume that this mechanism will be designed to enforce Hamas submission to that authority.

Israel could go beyond its declared aims and bring Hamas down if the Islamist movement appeared sufficiently damaged by initial ground operations. If Israeli forces were positioned to do this, and Hamas began to unravel, the impetus to finish the job would be strong. This could make for a much quicker handoff to the PA.

As diplomats work to put together a cease-fire mechanism, Hamas will work hard to tempt governments to talk to it, persuading them to skirt the Quartet's insistence that Hamas not be "engaged" until it accepts past PA-Israel agreements, recognizes Israel, and renounces armed struggle.

Legitimation of Hamas could seal the fate of the "peace process" and give "resistance" the reputation of a winning strategy. But for now, Israel is united in pursuing its war of demolition against Hamas. Its aim is not only to stop the rockets from falling in southern Israel but to move toward a change of regime in Gaza.

Martin Kramer is senior fellow at the Shalem Center's Adelson Institute for Strategic Studies in Jerusalem. He is also the Wexler-Fromer fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and a senior fellow at the Olin Institute, Harvard University.
 

Israel Seeks Land Dominance

Defense Update News, September 2008

Edited by Andy Ross

The IDF intentionally refrained from large-scale ground maneuver operations during the 2006 Lebanon war. A subsequent commission determined that ground operations relying on large-scale and rapid maneuver warfare remain significant elements in any future IDF warfighting.

In the years to 2006, the IDF land forces had suffered continuous degradation in training, resulting in a loss of essential knowledge and capabilities. Lack of training and inadequate equipment were key to the overall poor performance demonstrated by the ground forces during the conflict. The main problem was an unimaginative and indecisive conduct of large-scale ground operations.

Lacking area dominance, the IDF response to threats was incomplete and insufficient. Deliberate tactical moves were rapidly reduced to evacuation of casualties after initial engagements with the enemy. In an attempt to reduce vulnerability to missile threats, the IDF limited operations to night time. Movement of lightly armored vehicles was prohibited throughout the theater while heavy armor was ordered to move off-road. These factors had a negative effect on combat support to forward forces.

Land dominance is where land forces perform a series of rapid and decisive operations, employing maneuver forces throughout the battle area, precisely, lethally and effectively, to defeat the enemy. Land dominance was not achieved during the 2006 Lebanon War.

To regain its capability to maneuver effectively in threat-infected areas, the IDF is preparing its forces through an aggressive training and force build-up process to achieve land dominance throughout the battle area, during high intensity as well as asymmetric warfare operations.
 

AR  Israel has a reasonable political goal here and a credible tool in the IDF to push toward it.